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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant, Robert A. Watson ("Claimant"), is represented by Rick D.
Kallas of Boise, Idaho. Respondents-Defendants, Joslin Millwork, Inc. ("Joslin")
and Liberty Northwest Insurance Co., are represented by E. Scott Harmon and
Kimberly A. Doyle of Boise, Idaho.
A hearing was held before Referee Michael E. Powers on December 19,
2008. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation were entered
by Referee Powers on May 21, 2009, and an Order adopting those findings and
conclusions

was

unanimously

entered

by

the

Industrial

Commission

("Commission") on June 8, 2009. The Commission specifically found Claimant
failed to prove his need for surgery is the result of an occupational disease
arising out of and in the course of his employment. R. p. 96, f/ 15.
Claimant moved, infer aiia, to reconsider and to strike medical opinions.

R. p. 100-48, 152-f59. On October ?4, 2009, the Commission unanimously
denied Claimant's motions to strike and for reconsideration, finding that "the
facts support the decision issued on June 8, 2009," which decision "is supported
by substantial evidence in the record and Claimant has presented no persuasive
argument to disturb the decision." R. p. 175-76.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The basic facts in this matter are undisputed. The Claimant is currently
33 years old. After moving to Idaho, Claimant worked hanging drywall for about

ten years prior to going to work for Joslin on September 13, 2005. Tr. 152-10.
Prior to this claim, Claimant had not filed any workers compensation claim for
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low back pain or injury. However, Claimant did seek medical care from Dr. Scott
Meissner, a chiropractor, for low back pain and maintenance in December 2005,
causing him to miss three days of work.

Tr, 18:6-12; 19:3-5; 19:19-20. As

evident in Dr. Meissner's notes, Claimant's onset of back pain was without injury
and occurred while at home on a Sunday. Def. Ex. C:16.
Prior to his employment with Joslin, Claimant had complained to his
supervisor that he wanted to get out of the drywall business because it was
causing him back pain. While employed at Joslin, however, Claimant never
complained of back pain or injury. Cl. Ex. 2:2001.
As part of his job for Joslin, Claimant operated a beam saw and was
required to lift panels of laminate particle board with an approximate weight of 70
pounds. Tr. 22:19-23; R. p. 14. Claimant admits that during his work with Joslin,
he never suffered a low back injury or accident. Tr. 4:17-23; 36:17-20.
In November 2007, Claimant began having what he describes as sharp
cramping pain in his left buttocks that radiated down into the back of his left
knee. Tr. 36:9-16. Claimant's first medical care related to this onset of low back
pain was on December 12, 2007 when he went to Dr. Miles Ranck, another
chiropractor. Tr. 37:2-10; Def. Ex. E. The treatment received from Dr. Ranck did
not help Claimant, and he was then referred to Dr. James Bates, a physiatrist,
who he saw on January, 17 2008. Tr. 43:lO-17; Def. Ex. D:21. Again Claimant
reported to Dr. Bates that he did not have an injury that started the back pain.
Dr. Bates ordered an MRI, which showed the Claimant had a herniated disk; Dr.
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Bates then referred Claimant to Dr. Roy Tyler ~rizzell.' Tr. 44:22-25; Def. Ex.
D:24. Claimant first saw Dr. Frinell in March 2008. Tr. 459-2; Def. Ex. D:28.
According to the Claimant, it was not until he saw Dr. Frizzell in March
2008 that he made a possible connection between his work and low back
symptoms. Tr. 48:23-49:5. However, prior to this visit with Dr. Frizzell, Claimant
already had filled out a First Report of Injury with Joslin in February of 2008
indicating he hurt his back at work in November of 2007 (Tr. 50:7-16; CI. Ex. 1);
Claimant described it as a pinched nerve in his back. Tr. 3791-17; CI. Ex. I .
Under cross examination, Claimant admitted the pain did not start at work, but
rather at home. Tr. 59.12- 60:12.
Claimant filed a Complaint in this case on June 11, 2008, asserting he
"contracted/incurred an occupational disease in h ~ slow back as the result of
performing his job duties for Joslin." R. p. I . Respondents filed their Answer on
July 2, 2008, denying both that Claimant incurred an occupational disease and
also that any alleged occupational disease was not due to the nature of his
employment.

R. p. 8.

Just two months later, on September 10, 2008,

Respondents retained Dr. Michael Weiss of St. Luke's Occupational Health to
perform an Independent Medical Exam ("IME").

CI. Ex. 14.

Dr. Weiss

subsequently issued his written report on October 1, 2008, stating Claimant has
chronic low back pain and sciatica as well as multilevel degenerative disk
disease.

Def. Ex. F:42-46.

Dr. Weiss further stated back pain and spinal

1

Claimant failed to note in his testimony that he appeared at the St. Alphonsus emergency room
on January 4, 2008, complaining of a two month history of back pain without injury and no ment~on
of prior treatment by Dr. Ranck or Dr. Bates. Def. Ex. A:7.
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arthritis are common in the general population, and heavy labor jobs are not
more likely to cause back problems than sedentary jobs. Def. Ex. F:46. The
only post-hearing deposition taken in this case was of Dr. Weiss. CI. Briefp. 7.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
While Claimant notices 11 separate issues on appeal, most of these can
be condensed into three primary arguments. First, despite his characterizations
to the contrary, Claimant essentially is asking this Court to reweigh the evidence
presented to the Commission and make its own independent determination as to
how it would have decided this case. As discussed below, such is not the
~rovinceof this Court.
Similarly, Defendants presented Ciaimant - prior to hearing - with all
expert evidence on which they would rely at hearing and in the post-hearing
deposition and briefs. Any arguments to the contrary, especially where the entire
purpose of post-hearing expert testimony is to give the expert an opportunity to
flesh out his or her opinion, are unfounded.
Second, workers' compensation matters are highly fact-specific and
frequently turn, and differ, based on those facts. Accordingly, it is within the
Commission's discretion to weigh the evidence presented by the parties and
make a determination particular to that case - despite how another case with
similar but significantly distinguishing facts was decided. Simply because one
case was decided prior to another does not make the earlier case controlling.
Third, like all other tribunals in this state, the Industrial Commission is
bound to apply the law as it exists; it cannot ignore controlling precedent even
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where neither of the parties cite it. Claimant is, in effect, on notice of all prior
binding Commission and related Supreme Court caselaw and it is disingenuous
for him to argue otherwise.
In summary response to the above arguments, Respondents maintain the
Commission's determinations both comport with ldaho statutes and settled
caselaw and are based on substantial and competent evidence in the record.
Additionally, there are strong policy reasons supporting the Commission's
decision - and consequently the Respondents' position - in this case. As such,
the Court should deny Claimant's appeal in its entirety and not award him any
attorneys fees
ARGUMENT

A.

THE REQUISITE STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
MILITATE IN RESPONDENTS' FAVOR ON APPEAL

I.

This Court's review of lndustrial Commission cases is
deferential, particularly in regard to factual findings

On appeal from a decision of the ldaho lndustrial Commission, the
Supreme Court gives great deference to the Commission's rulings. This Court
exercises free review over questions of law, but not over the questions of fact.
As restated in Sunquist v. Precision Steel & Gypsum, Inc., 141 ldaho 450, 453,

When reviewing a decision of the lndustrial Commission, this Court
exercises free review over questions of law. Uhl v. Ballard Medical
Products, Inc., 138 ldaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003).
The question of when a claimant's medical condition becomes
"manifest" and "preexisting" relative to later events is a question of
fact. Dumaw v. J.L. Norton Logging, 118 ldaho 150, 155, 795 P.2d
312, 317 (1990). The factual findinas of the lndustrial Commission
will be upheld provided they are supported by substantial and
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competent evidence. Uhl, 138 ldaho at 657, 67 P.3d at 1269.
'Substantial and competent evidence is relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.' Id. The
conclusions reached by the Industrial Commission regarding the
credibility and weight of evidence will not be disturbed unless the
conclusions are clearly erroneous. Hughen v. Highland Estates,
I 3 7 ldaho 349, 351, 48 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2002). We will not reweiqh the evidence or consider whether we would have drawn a
different conclusion from the evidence presented. (Emphasis
added).'
Likewise, because the Commission is the factfinder: it is "free to determine the
weiaht to be qiven to the testimony of'a medical. expert," and the Court "will not
disturb the Commission's conclusions as to the weight and credibility of expert
testimony unless such conclusions are clearly erroneous."

Lorca-Merono v.

Yokes Washingfon Foods, Inc., 137 ldaho 446, 452, 50 P.3d 461, 467 (2002).
Here, Claimant does not argue the Commission did not have sufficient evidence
to reach its decision. Rather, in defiance of Sunquisf, Wichferman- and Stolle,
Claimant simply is asking this Court to reweigh and reapply the evidence
presented.3

As explained above, the Court repeatedly has rejected this

approach and has refused to act as a second arbiter.

2.

Occupational diseases under Idaho law require specific proof

Various sections of the ldaho Code address occupational diseases. The
term itself is defined in relevant part in I.C. 3 72-102(22)(a) as "a disease due to
the nature of an employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist,

See also Wichferman v J.H. Kelly, Inc., 144 ldaho 138, 140, 158 P.3d 301, 303 (2007) ("The
Court construes the record most favorably to the party prevailing below, and does not try the
matter anew") and SfoNe v. Benneff, 144 ldaho 44,49, 156 P.3d 545, 550 (2007).
3

Specifically, please refer to Ciaimant's Issues Presented on Appeai nos. 1 through 8 and 10.
App. Brief p. 15-16.
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are characteristic of, and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or
employment." Additionally, "contracted" or "incurred," when referring to an
occupational disease, "shall be deemed the equivalent of the term 'arising out of
and in the course of' employment."'4 I.C. § 72-102(22)(b). An employee is
entitled to compensation for an occupational disease when he or she
is thereby disabled from performing his work in the last occupation
in which he was injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease, or dies as a result of such disease, and the disease was
due to the nature of an occupation or process in which he was
employed within the period previous to his disablement as
hereinafter limited .. . .
I.C. § 72-437. Finally, as it applies to this case, an employer is not liable for any
compensation for an occupational disease "unless such disease is actually
incurred in the employer's employment." I.C. § 72-439(1).

3.

Claimant did not meet his burden of proof at hearing

Because Claimant admits he never had an injury or accident while
working for Joslin (CI. Brief p. 9), the Commission properly focused on whether
his back condition constitutes a compensable occupational disease. This Court
addressed the requisite burden of proof in such cases as follows:
As with industrial accident claims, an occupational disease
claimant has the burden of proving, to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, a causal connection between the condition for
which compensation is claimed and occupational exposure to the
substance or conditions which caused the alleged condition.
Langley v. Sfafe, lndus. Special Indem. Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 786, 890 P.2d

4

The Court has interpreted this phrase as follows: "The words 'out of' have been heid to refer to
the origin and cause of the accidents and the words 'in the course of' refer to the time, place, and
the circumstances under which the accident occurred." Thompson v. Clear Springs Foods, Inc.,
Idaho Supreme Court no. 36159-2009 (filed March 16, 2010) (internal citations omitted).
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732, 737 (1995), citing Hagler v. Micron Technology, Inc., 118 ldaho 596, 598,
798 P.2d 55, 57 (1990).

In Langley, the Court upheld the Industrial

Commission's decision and determined that while the claimant's work
environment may have irritated his medical condition, he failed to prove by
substantial and competent evidence that such condition was causally related to
that environment; claimant thus did not carry his burden of proving he suffered
from an occupational disease. 126 ldaho at 786-87, 890 P.2d at 737-38.
The proof presented by a claimant must establish a probable - not merely
a possible - connection, or causal link, between cause and effect to support the
contention the claimant suffered a compensable accident. Callantine v. Blue
Ribbon Linen Supply, 103 ldaho 734, 735, 653 P.2d 455, 456 (1982); Beardsley

v. ldaho Forest Indusfries, 127 ldaho 404, 406, 901 P.2d 511, 513 (1995). A
claimant also must provide medical testimony that supports a claim for
compensation to a reasonable degree of medical probability. Langley, 126 ldaho
at 785, 890 P. 2d at 736. "Probable" is defined as "having more evidence for
than against.'' Fisher v. Bunker Hill Co., 96 ldaho 341, 344, 528 P.2d 903, 906
(1974). The Commission's determination as to whether the claimant has met its
burden of proof is subject to the Commission's sound discretion:
The determination of whether a particular injury arose out of and in
the course of employment is a question of fact for the Commission.
... Such a determination necessarily involves weighing the
evidence and assessing the credibility of the various witnesses,
and is therefore committed to the expertise of the Commission.
The Commission's conclusions as to the weight and credibility of
the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous.
Vernon v. Omark Indusfries, 113 ldaho 358, 744 P. 2d 86 (1987) (internal
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citations omitted).

Substantial and competent evidence is that which a

reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Duncan v.
Navajo Trucking, 134 ldaho 202, 998 P.2d 1115 (2000).

B.

THE COMMISSION PROPERLY HELD CLAIMANT FAILED TO PROVE
HIS NEED FOR SURGERY WAS THE RESULT OF AN
OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ARISING OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT
1.

The Industrial Commission had sufficient evidence to
determine Claimant's back condition is not an occupational
disease under ldaho law

As Claimant correctly notes, the fundamental dispute in this case is
whether or not Claimant's job duties caused his lumbar degenerative disc
disease. CI. Brief p. 17. The Commission determined they did not. Claimant is
now trying to persuade the Court otherwise by basically repeating everything he
already has presented to the Commission b e ~ o w . ~
Respondents maintain the
Commission correctly decided the issue and there is now neither a need nor a
basis for the Court to reweigh the evidence. In short, the Commission had
before it the opinions of both parties' experts and was free to evaluate that
evidence and reach a conclusion. That conclusion should not be disturbed on
appeal. See, e.g., Sunquist, 141 ldaho at 453, 111 P.3d at 138.

2.

The Commission found Dr. Weiss' opinions more persuasive,
leading it to determine Claimant's back condition does not
meet the definition of an occupational disease under ldaho law

The crux of this case boils down to the Industrial Commission finding the
analyses and opinions of Respondents' expert, Dr. Weiss, more persuasive than
5

See Claimant's Issue Presented on Appeal nos. 1 through 8 and 10. CI. Briefp. 15-35, 37-47.
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those of Claimant's expert, Dr. Roy Tyler ~ r i z z e l l .R.
~ p. 94 'f[ 11; p. 171, 175-76.
Dr. Weiss has a long history in occupational medicine. Up to joining the
Peace Corps in February 2009, he was the director of the St. Luke's
occupational health services program as well as a consultant for the ldaho State
Insurance Fund, ldaho Power, Paradigm Health (a case management company),
and the ldaho Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Weiss fr. 5:4-12. 6:12-15.
He is board certified by the American College of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine and has a degree in epidemiology, which is the study of
disease in the population and "goes right to the heart of causation." Weiss Tr.

Dr. Weiss testified as to the ubiquitous nature of back pain, supporting

Respondents' position that Claimant failed to prove his degenerative disk
disease is an occupational disease as that term is defined under ldaho law. For
example, because back pain occurs in 96 to 98% of the population, it is
impossible to establish a causal connection between back pain and work when it
is "something that everybody has." Weiss fr. 17:8-13. Similarly, one in five
individuals under the age of 20, 50% of individuals age 40, and 85% of older
individuals will have herniated disks visible on an MRI.

Weiss fr. 17:14-24,

'24:17-20. Chronic back pain is as common in sedentary jobs as in heavy lifting

jobs, and heavy lifting is not harmful in and of itself.' Weiss fr. 20:18-20, 22:186

See Claimant's Issue Presented on Appeal nos. 4 and 6. CI. Briefp. 16, 25-26, 27-28

' For example, there is not a higher incidence of disk herniations in weight lifters.

Weiss tr. 48:2349:12. See aiso Lorca-Merono, 137 ldaho at 454, 50 P.3d at 469 (referring to one of the medical
experts it found persuasive, the Court stated "the activities of life" can cause degenerative disc
disease, which "is a wear and tear phenomenon that we all get to a greater or iesser extent").
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25. Finally, degenerative disk disease can be related to a wide variety of factors

(e.g., heredity, aging, smoking, obesity, etc.) that are completely unrelated to a
person's job.'

Weiss fr. 18:17-23.

When one considers the nature of degenerative disk disease as outlined
by Dr. Weiss, and the prevalence of chronic back pain in the population as a
whole, it is apparent Claimant has not met his burden of proving his back
condition is "characteristic of, and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or
employment" as required by I.C. § 72-102(22)(a). Claimant also has failed to
meet the requirements of I.C. § 72-102(22)(b) and 72-439(1) by showing he
"contracted" or "incurred" an occupational disease arising out of and in the
course of his employment.

As Dr. Weiss testified under oath, Claimant's

degenerative disk diseaselarthritis would have developed over years. It would
not have developed in the short time Claimant worked for Joslin and it is not
associated strictly with lifting heavy objects.

We-iss fr. 23:5-20, 2298-25.

Therefore, Claimant's condition could not "arise out oP' his employment.
Claimant argues these and similar facts to which Dr. Weiss testified are "generic observation[s]."
CI. Brief p. 12. However, as previously stated, Dr. Weiss is an epidemioiogist, board certified in
occupational medicine, and has 20 years experience with such issues. Weiss tr. 5'4-25,. 6:l-15,
13:3-10, 58:23-25. Such "observations" thus are based on his long career as an expert in this
very fieid.
Moreover, Claimant asserts there is not substantial or competent evidence to support Dr. Weiss'
opinion Claimant's degenerative disc disease may be caused by a variety of factors, including
age, diet, smoking, or obesity. Ci. Briefp. 16, 27-28 (Issue Presented on Appeal No. 6.) This is a
vary narrow reading of both the Commission's decision and Dr. Weiss' testimony. First, the
Commission based its decision on the record as a whoie, which included evidence from both Dr.
Frizzell and Dr. Weiss. See, e.g., R. p. 175-76. In other words, there is no indication the
Commission decided in Respondents' favor based soieiy on this one, isoiated comment from Dr.
Weiss. For that reason, the Court should disregard this basis for Ciaimant's appeal. Second, one
of the major and overriding points of Dr. Weiss' testimony is that because back pain is
overwhelmingly common in the population as a whoie, he cannot conclude Ciaimant's
degenerative disc disease was causally related to his work. Therefore, whether or not that
disease is related to age, diet, smoking, or obesity is whoiiy irrelevant.
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Claimant lists in his brief what he considers to be a whole host of
problems with Dr. Weiss' testimony. First, he argues the Commission, and now
this Court, should discount or entirely ignore Dr. Weiss' opinions because he did
not review Claimant's job description or hearing testimony, or ask Claimant about
his job, before issuing his IME report or giving his deposition.$ See, e.g., CI.
Brief p. 13, 25. While true, this is completely irrelevant. As stated just above,
because back pain is so common, it is impossible to establish a causal
connection between a person's job and back condition.

Weiss

tr. 17.9-13.

Claimant's job duties at Joslin thus would not "make any difference, because the
issue, again, becomes one of cumulative trauma versus specific trauma." Weiss

tr. 50:IO-51:15.

Additionally, Dr. Weiss testified his opinions are on a medically

more probable than not basis, which is customary in Commission matters.
Weiss

tr. 23:5-12; see also Duncan, 134 ldaho at 204, 998 P.2d at 1117 (stating

"[ilt is a function of the Commission and not of this Court to determine the
credibility of witnesses, the weight to be assigned testimony, and the reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the record as a whole"). Therefore, based on his
experience in general and his IME of Claimant in particular, Dr. Weiss
determined Claimant did not have an occupational disease incurred in his
employment with Joslin - and the Commission agreed.

9

Two of the three cases Claimant cites in support of this argument are entirely unhelpfui because
neither is an appeai from the Industrial Commission. CI. Brief p. 25, citing Bromley v. Garey, 132
ldaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999) and J-U-B Engineers v. Security Ins., 146 ldaho 311, 193 P.3d
858 (2008). Claimant then overstates the language of Politte v. Dept. of Transp., which merely
noted that the Commission did not accept an expert's testimony as persuasive in part because the
foundation for the surgeon's opinion was unclear. 126 ldaho 270, 271, 882 P.2d 437, 438 (1994).
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3.

As the Commission ruled, Defendants made proper prehearing disclosure of Dr. Weiss' medical opinions

Claimant asserts in his brief Dr. Weiss "created, developed or
manufactured" medical opinions post-hearing, of which Claimant further argues
he did not receive proper pre-hearing disclo~ure.'~CI. Brief p. 20, 21. These
assertions are unfounded.
First, Dr. Weiss did not "create" any opinions post-hearing.'l

While his

deposition testimony admittedly is lengthier than his IME report, the two do not
differ in any meaningful way.

The deposition testimony simply provides the

analytic framework Dr. Weiss used when formulating his opinions.

This is

perfectly consistent with the purpose of post-hearing expert depositions in ldaho
workers' compensation proceedings: if an expert is precluded from expanding
upon, explaining, or otherwise altering the opinions disclosed in exhibits prior to
hearing, it begs the question of why the Commission allows such depositions at
Indeed, there are two primary purposes of post-hearing depositions. One
is to provide opportunities to the expert to explain his or her methodology,
analysis, and opinions; the second is to give opposing counsel a chance to
cross-examine and potentially get the expert to alter an opinion set forth in a

10

See Claimant's Issues Presented on Appeal nos. 2 and 3. CI. Briefp. 16, 20-25.

ll

In support of Issue Presented on Appeal no. 3, Claimant cites to Clark v. Klein, 137 ldaho 154,
45 P.3d 810 (2002). Id. at p. 20. However, Clark is a civil case that has nothing whatsoever to do
with workers compensation.
'iz

See, e.g., Order on Reconsideration and Pending Motions in this case, where the Commission
states "the purpose behind the post-hearing deposition is to allow parties the ability to further flesh
out the details behind that which is stated in a report. Details and explanations, which may not be
included in the report, may be of great importance to a party's case." R. p. 176-77.
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document already in evidence before the

om mission.'^

The Court's decision in Lorca-Merono is instructive here. In that case, the
claimant argued the Commission erred by considering the post-hearing
deposition testimony of a medical expert, Dr. Linder. 137 ldaho at 452, 50 P.3d
at 467. The Court disagreed and explained as follows:
The Commission overruied Claimant's objection to Dr. Linder's
deposition testimony on the grounds that Claimant had failed to
identify any document provided to Dr. Linder after the hearing that
was not known at the time of the hearing, that on direct
examination Dr. Linder essentially repeated the diagnoses and
conclusions contained in his medical reports that had been
admitted into evidence at the hearing, and that the majority of his
deposition testimony was developed during cross-examination by
Claimant's counsel. On appeal, Claimant has not identified any
diagnosis or opinion rendered by Dr. Linder during his deposition
testimony that differed from the diagnoses and opinions contained
in his earlier reports.

Id., 137 ldaho at 454, 50 P.3d at 469. This is precisely the situation here. While
Claimant characterizes Dr. Weiss' deposition as "surprise disclosure of new
unknown medical opinions," there is no such surprise in this case. CI. Brief p.
21. As just explained, this case operated as does virtually every other Industrial
Commission matter: a party's expert provides a report that is disclosed prior to
hearing and included as a hearing exhibit, and the parties then take that expert's
deposition post-hearing. Claimant's exaggerated explanations as to what may
happen in future cases if the Court does not overturn the Commission's decision

'3 Certainly Claimant would not seek to exclude Dr. Weiss' testimony on the grounds it was
"created, developed or manufactured" post-hearing if his testimony were that his IME report was
dead wrong basecl on the evidence presented at hearing and he now agrees Claimant incurred an
occupational disease at Josiin. While such was not the case here, this point shows Claimant's
Issues Presented on Appeai nos. 2 and 3 are simply irrational.
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are ~ n f o u n d e d . ' See,
~
e.g., CI. Brief p. 21-22. The Court thus should follow its
decision in Lorca-Merono and uphold the Commission's determination regarding
the validity and weight of Dr. Weiss' deposition.
Second, Claimant had adequate notice of Dr. Weiss' opinions. In support
of his argument that he did not, Claimant maintains "pre-hearing expert witness
disclosure requirements of I.C.R.P. 26(b)(4) apply to workers' compensation
claims by operation of J.R.P. 7(A) and J.R.P. 7(C)." CI. Brief p. 20. It is telling,
however, that Claimant cites no case in support of this proposition. It.is equally
telling that Claimant completely ignores the fact that Respondent pointed out in
its Response to Claimant's Motion to Strike Undisclosed Medical Opinions that
"actions before the Industrial Commission are not governed by the ldaho Rules
of Civil Procedure." R. p. 161, citing Page v. McCain Foods, Inc., 145 ldaho 302,
31 1, 179 P.3d 265, 274 (2008). What makes this omission even more significant
is that Claimant cites this exact case (Page) in his own appellate brief. CI. Brief
p. 26, 48.
Claimant goes on to argue multiple times in his brief that Dr. Weiss did not
answer the causation question in his IME report and did not give any opinions

14

Indeed, if the Court were to accept Claimant's arguments, it effectively would switch the entire
process to one in which expert depositions are taken gjg to hearing. Likewise, if experts were
merely going to restate everything contained in their written reports without explaining their
rationale and analysis, there would be absolutely no purpose in conducting post-hearing
depositions in the first place. By their very nature, such depositions are designed to allow experts
to explain their opinions. See, e.g., J.R.P. lO(E)(4) ("Experts testifying post-hearing may base an
opinion on exhibits and evidence admitted at hearing") and Lockeft v. Quality Eiectric, Inc., IC 03001478, 2005 WL 1131008 (Feb. 7, 2005) (finding a medicai expert's opinion was based on
information available prior to and at hearing, and stating the Commission's Judiciai Rules of
Practice do "not prohibit an opinion developed post-hearing. Rather, [the rules] prohibit an opinion
based on evidence or information developed br obtained post-hearing. ... It matters not when [the
expert] actually formulated his opinion") (emphasis in original).
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refuting the elements of an occupational disease claim prior to his deposition.
See, e.g., CI. Brief p. 12, 19. However, as Dr. Weiss explained in his deposition
upon cross-examination from Claimant's counsel, the second-to-last paragraph
of his IME report explains why he disagrees with Dr: Frizzell and instead believes
Claimant does not have an occupational disease causally related to his
employment with Joslin.

Weiss fr. 43:17-45:ll.

Claimant should not be

"surprised" by this conclusion
Finally, Claimant asserts the Commission's reliance on Dr. Weiss'
deposition testimony means defense experts may "formuiate an unlimited
number of new medical opinions after the hearing," which deprives Claimant of
his "right to obtain rebuttal opinion" from his experts prior to hearing. CI. Brief p.

22. This argument is fallacious on a few points. First, as explained, there were
no "new" opinions disclosed post-hearing in this case. Dr. Weiss stated in his
IME report that Claimant's degenerative disc disease was not causally related to
his job. Weiss tr. 43117-45:ll. At his deposition, he merely explained the basis
for that opinion - nothing more. Second, Claimant himself admits he provided
Dr. Weiss' IME to his experts, Drs. Frizzell and Bates, prior to hearing.15 CI. Brief

p. 13-14. Those doctors thus had the opportunity to respond and provide a
"rebuttal opinion." In short, the alleged issues regarding Dr. Weiss' deposition

'5 Ciaimant points out the Commission did not comment on Dr. Bates' reports and it is thus
unciear whether the Commission considered Dr. Bates' opinions. CI. Briefp. 18, fn 3. However, if
the Commission were to specificaliy state whether or not it considered each and every piece of
evidence presented by the parties, its decisions would take voiumes - particuiariy because the
records in Commission cases oftentimes take up hundreds of pages of documents and testimony.
Moreover, as the Commission stated in its Order on Reconsideration and Pending Motions, its
June 8, 2009 decision "is supported by substantiai evidence in the record." R. p. 176.
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are not nearly as complicated as Claimant makes them seem, and there is no
basis on which the Court should determine the Commission improperly relied on
his testimony.

4.

The Commission determined Dr. Frizzell's opinions were not
as persuasive as Dr. Weiss' opinions

To support his occupational disease claim, Claimant elicited the services
of Dr. Roy Tyler Frizzell, a neurosurgeon in Boise. Because Dr. Frizzell did not
give a post-hearing deposition, Claimant's only evidence in this case is found in
two terse, separate letters. CI. Ex. 8:803Q-42. As is readily apparent from those
letters, Dr. Frizzell merely answered "yes" to a handful of questions from
Claimant's attorney but he did not provide any analysis whatsoever as to how he
reached those

conclusion^.'^

Id. For example, Dr. Frizzell did not explain what

he believes is the difference between an occupational disease and low back pain
in the general public.

He also did not explain in the letters how he would

differentiate between an occupational disease and a disk herniated by an acute
injury.
As specifically stated in its Order on Reconsideration and Pending
Motions, the Commission "was not persuaded by Dr. Frizzell's opinion" because
the letter he submitted "provided little elaboration on the facts and science
supporting [his] apparent conclusions on the causation question at the heart of

16

It is a bit of an overstatement that Dr. Frizzell issued "a narrative report" or a "written report" or a
"supplemental report." CI. Briefp. I ? ,13. Instead, Claimant's attorney merely sent Dr. Frinell a
handful of questions in a letter, and Dr. Frineli then answered "yes" to each of those questions
without explanation. CI. Ex. 8:8039-40. Even Dr. Frizzell's subsequent letter dated October 30,
2008 provides very littie detail or analysis. CI. Ex. 8:8041-42.
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this case.""

R . ' p . 173; see also R. p. 94 at

T/ 11 (questioning how Dr. Frizzell

could conclude Claimant's disease arose out of and in the course of his
employment with Joslin). The Commission accorded Dr. Weiss' opinions greater
weight, particularly "[wlhen viewed in context of the entire case." R. p. 173.
Claimant's appeal thus is an attempt to convince the Court to side with Dr.
Frizzell, but such second-guessing of the Industrial Commission is expressly
prohibited by Lorca-Merono, 137 ldaho at 452, 50 P.3d at 467.

5.

Public policy militates against Claimant's arguments on
appeal

Because back pain affects a huge majority of the population (see Weiss
fr. 17.3-24, 24:17-20), Claimant effectively is arguing the workers compensation
system should be converted into a universal health care system. This the Court
should decline to do. First, the basic purpose of workers compensation in ldaho
is to "provide compensation for 'injuries received and occupational diseases
contracted in industrial and public work"' because it "does not purport to be a
social insurance program covering all a worker's health problems."

Binf v,

Creative Foresf Products, 108 ldaho 116, 120, 697 P.2d 818, 822 (1985)
(emphasis in original). Claimant, however, asks the Court to ignore this principle
and instead hold that whenever an employee has a job that involves any kind of
17

Ciaimant asserts Drs. Frizzell and Bates "plainly and unequivocally expressed their convictions
that the hazards of ... [Claimant's job] caused his non-acute lumbar spine disease." CI. Brief p.
18. While it is true these experts expressed their opinions, they certainiy did not
them.
Indeed, when deriding Dr. Weiss' opinions and the Commissions' purported mispiaced reliance
thereon, Ciaimant negiects to point out the Commission also found there was no basis on which
to evaluate Dr. Frizzell's analysis because there was none. R. p. 94 lj 71; p. 173. Ciaimant had
the burden of proof here, which he did not carry. See Langley, 126 ldaho at 786, 890 P.2d at 737
and Jones v. Emmett Manor, 134 idaho 160, 163,997 P.2d 621,624 (2000) (noting a letter from a
physician was not substantial evidence to overcome a presumption in favor of the opposing party).
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lifting and he or she subsequently develops back pain -whether causally related
to the job or not - workers compensation should be required to pay for all
relevant medical treatment.I8 This is not permitted under Bint.
Second, the potential impact of such a ruling is positively enormous particularly where it is estimated 96 to 98% of individuals will develop back pain
at some point in their lives and the incidence of back pain is nearly equivalent
when comparing heavy lifting jobs to sedentary jobs. Weiss

tr. 179-13, 20:17-

20, 44:15-20. Moreover, if the Commission were forced to compensate workers
with degenerative disk disease who had their heavy lifting jobs for only a short
period of time (i.e., 61 days or more per I.C. § 72-439(b)), workers compensation
would be covering medical treatment for a disease that takes years to develop.lg
Weiss fr. 19:7-10, 23:15-18.

Because degenerative disk disease generally is a

product of aging and does not correlate with work or lifting heavy objects, ruling
in Claimant's favor on this issue would convert workers compensation ~ntoa
general health care policy. The Court should not take that road.
18

Claimant asserts the Commission erred by finding, without adequate explanation, Claimant's
job-reiated activities can speed the progression of degenerative disc disease but those same
activities cannot cause this disease. Ci. Briefp.16, 26-27 (Issue Presented on Appeal no. 5). It is
admittediy difficult to foliow this argument, but it appears Claimant is presenting a medicai opinion
without any expert testimony whatsoever. indeed, the Commission did not make this finding
simply because there was no evidence in the record to support it. The Commission cannot make
up its own findings of fact; it has to base its decisions on the evidence the parties present. See,
e.g., Jones, 134 Idaho at 163, 997 P.2d at 624 ("Workmen's compensation cases, because of
their medicai aspects, depend upon knowledge neither expected nor possessed by lay witnesses,
and the basis for any award must rest upon and be supported by medical testimony").
19

An analogy may prove instructive here. Say, for example, a moderately active 21 year-old who
has oniy been in school and never has had a paying job goes to work on June 1, 2010 moving
irrigation pipe. That person soon develops back pain and learns he or she has degenerative disk
disease. By Claimant's iogic, that person would be able to maintain an occupational disease
claim as of August 2, 2010. However, if the same person instead goes to work as a receptionist
who only answers phones all day, he or she would not be able to maintain an occupational
disease claim on the same date. The absurdity of that result requires no explanation.
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C.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MATTERS ARE HIGHLY FACT-SPECIFIC,
AND IT IS FOR THE COMMISSION - NOT THE COURT - T O DECIDE
WHETHER OR NOT A PREVIOUS DECISION IS SUFFICIENTLY
FACTUALLY SIMILAR SO AS TO BE CONTROLLING

Claimant spent a great deal of his time urging the Commission, and now
the Court, that because this case is factually similar to Flores v. Boise Cascade,
IC 2006-001912, 2008 WL 2559351 (June 30, 2008)," it also should be found
here his degenerative disk disease is an occupational disease."

Claimant goes

on for pages in his appellate brief discussing Flores and its alleged similarities to
this case. However, it all boils down to one simple fact: this is a different case
with sufficiently different facts to lead the Commission to a different conclusion.
Claimant begins by arguing stare decisis.

That is, because Flores is

"closely analogous" to this case, the Commission should have decided in
Claimant's favor here as well. CI. Brief p. 28-29. What Claimant ignores is that
Commission matters are highly fact-specific such that even with similar (but not
identical) facts, two cases may be decided on entirely different grounds and in
favor of opposing parties.22 Indeed, while Claimant cites numerous facts he
believes Flores and this case have in common, he ignores the apparent
differences between the two decisions that led the Commission in this case to
find against him. First, the two Claimants did not have the same jobs. Claimant

20

Availabie at http:llwww.iic.idaho.aovldecisionsl2OO8/O6 081flores v boise cascade.pdf.

21

GI. Briefp. 16, 28-36 (Issues Presented on Appeai Nos. 7 and 8).

22

See also R. p. 95 at ¶ 12 ("Although, Flores bears some similarity to the instant matter, that
case was decided on its own particular facts, and on those facts, the Comm~ssionwas persuaded
that Claimant's low back injury was, in fact, causally related to the demands of his employment.
The Referee does not find that the evidence before him in this matter supports the same
conclusion.")
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here was a Sawyer/Assembler while the Flores claimant worked primarily on two
machines for 32 years in his employer's box-making factor.
Flores, IC 2006-001912 at

1 4.

CI. ~ r i ep.
f 10;

Second, the defendants in Flores did not

produce medical evidence on a medically more probable than not basis that
degenerative disk disease occurs regardless of an individual's workplace. As
explained above, Respondents did present such evidence in this case. Third, all
Claimant has presented here is an opinion of a doctor that repeated lifting,
bending, and similar activities will cause low back degenerative disk disease. CI.

Ex. 8:8039-42. Claimant, however, ignores the fact the same condition will result
in someone who never lifts anything at

Weiss fr. 20117-20, 44:15-20.

Flores did not address this epidemiological argument. Fourth, the machines on
which the claimant worked in Flores were a major part of the Commission's
decision, not lifting, twisting, bending, and other activities claimant performed.
Flores, IC 2006-001912 at

1 4-6, 49.

No such showing was, made here. Fifth,

the Flores claimant established his job duties "set [his] work apart from the
'general run' of labor jobs" in that it was the constant repetition - not the level of
exertion - that distinguished his job from typical manual labor jobs. Flores, IC
2006-001912 at

1 49,

cifing Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759

(1996). Again, no such showing was made here.
Claimant further attempts to support his Flores argument by pointing out

23 Flores also noted that the "Commission has observed that a Claimant's belief about the 'cause'
of his complaints Is as likely to be wrong as it is to be correct." Further, in the Commission's
experience. "Claimants often suspect or believe [a condition] to be work related when it is later
shown to be unrelated." Such a belief is "not ... legally sufficient to establish ... entitlement to
benefits." IC 2006-001912 at I[ 44 (internal quotations omitted).
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Dr. Frizzell testified in that case as well (albeit on behalf of the defendants). Cl.
Brief p. 30-31. However, we do not know any of the details of Dr. Frizzell's
testimony in Flores, nor do we know what evidence defendants presented there.
All we know is the outcome. Therefore, how the fact that Dr. Frizzell testified in
both cases lends support to Claimant's argument here is unclear.24 Additionally,
if the Commission or the Court were to adhere to the principle that if it adopted
the opinions of a particular expert in one case it would be bound to adopt his or
her opinions in every subsequent case, the results would be disastrous. For
instance, the party able to either pay the expert's fee or retain him or her before
the other party would be at an overwhelming advantage in litigation. Indeed, by
Claimant's logic, that party would be able to virtually guarantee a victory - even
in cases where, such as here, the facts are highly specific and circumstances
would not warrant siding with a particular expert. It goes without saying this is
not how an adversarial system of justice operates.
In short, the Commission finds facts and makes conclusions of law. It
weighs evidence and makes credibility determinations.

It evaluates a case

according to the current state of the law. Here, simply put, the Commission
found facts differently than in Flores and thus reached a different conclusion.
That conclusion should not be disturbed on appeal. See, e.g., Sunquisf, 141
Idaho at 453 , I 1I P.3d at 138.

Claimant states in his appellate briefthat the "Commission adopted Dr. Frizzell's opinions in
Fiores." Ci. Brief p. 31. However, the Commission found Claimant's expert, Dr, Joseph Verska,
more persuasive than Dr. Frizzell. Flores, IC 2006-001912, rj 52-53.

24
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D.

THE COMMISSION MUST APPLY BINDING PRECEDENT WHETHER
OR NOT THE PARTIES RAISE A PARTICULAR CASE IN THEIR
BRIEFS OR AT HEARING

Claimant asserts he did not receive proper notice the Commission may
address Nelson v. Ponsness Warren ldgas Enterprises, 126 ldaho 129,879 P.2d
592 (1994), in this case, and when it did address Nelson, it did so improperly.25
Nelson stands for the proposition that preexisting conditions aggravated or
accelerated by an occupational disease are not compensable unless an
employee suffers an "accident" as that term is defined by the workers
compensation s t a t ~ t e s . ' ~ 126 ldaho at 132, 879 P.2d at 595.

Because

Claimant's Complaint alleged he had an occupational disease in his low back,
and Dr. Weiss discussed Claimant's prior back problems in his IME, it is well with
reason to expect the Commission to raise, cite, or rely upon i el son.^'
Claimant, however, goes on to complain that the Commission's use of the
phrase "threshold compensability" in regards to Nelson's discussion of
occupational diseases somehow means the Commission was rewriting the law.

25

See issues Presented on Appeal Nos. 9 and 10. CI. Briefp. 16-17, 35-44

26.Seealso Ogden, 128 ldaho 87, 910 P.2d 759. in that case, because there was no industrial
accident, claimant would not have a compensabie claim if his back conditions were preexisting.
However, finding a preexisting condition was irrelevant because the Commission determined
ciaimant did not have an occupational disease, largely due to a medicai expert who testified
herniated disks are often a result of a "non event" and occur in individuals who are not involved in
any strenuous activity. The Court noted that even though "another medical expert testified to the
conlrary, we are no1 lo weiqn tne ev~dence offered- DLI PLSI s:mp v delemine ,f r n g a
s~os:aitia and comperenr evidence lo suppor: tne Comm~ss.oi'sf~nd~nqs
" Tqe Coir: f ~ r t n e r
upneic tne Corrm~ss~or's
f~ndingrnai cia mant's work was 'no! d.st1ng~isna3le
from many otner
occupations which involve strenuous or heavy labor and concluded that he did not cont;act an
occupational disease in the course of his employment." Id., 128 Idaho at 89-90, 910 P.2d at 76162 (emphas~sadded, internal quotations omitted). See R. p. 96 at ¶ 14.
27

See Sunquisf, 141 ldaho at 453, 111 P.3d at 138 ("Nelson doctrine does not apply to
cases
where there is an occupational disease, only in those where ciaimant's occupational disease
preexisted employment with the employer from whom benefits are sought") (emphasis in original).
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CI. Brief p. 36-37, cifing R. p. 175. This is an exaggeration. The Commission
merely was stating Nelson is relevant to occupational disease claims; it was not
creating new elements of such claims or requiring Claimant to disprove Nelson.
This is a red herring. Moreover, what is particularly interesting about Claimant's
Nelson argument (i.e., he was "surprise[d]" by this issue, which was "unfair[]") is
that it was extensivelv discussed in Flores -the exact case Claimant repeatedly
and emphatically asserts the Commission and this Court should follow. CI. Brief
p. 35. In fact, Nelson has its own section in Flores. Flores, lC 2006-001912 at 7

50-55. Therefore, the argument that Claimant is "surprised" by the use of Nelson
is ufferly specious.
Furthermore, as Claimant cited, the Commission was correct in stating the
"Supreme Court's ruling in Nelson is not an optional law that the Commission
can ignore if the parties so request." CI. Brief p. 36, cifing R. p. 175. Neither the
Commission nor this Court may ignore an entire body of law and pretend it does
not exist simply upon such application by one of the parties. This would be akin
to asking the Court to ignore a subject matter jurisdiction issue because the
parties did not address it below. Rather, one of the fundamental purposes of the
Court is to raise all relevant caselaw that necessarily would control the outcome
of a case. If the Court were to adopt Claimant's reasoning, parties always would
be able to get out of unfavorable decisions or avoid adverse precedent by simply
saying, "I didn't know about that one." The absurdity of this is clear.
As further support for his argument the Commission misapplied Nelson,
Claimant goes on to list a number of purported erroneous findings of fact the
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Commission made when concluding he had a preexisting low back condition. CI.
Brief p. 37-43. However, as previously explained, this Court's standard of review
on appeal is one of deference - especially when it comes to findings of fact.
Sunquisf, 141 ldaho at 453, 111 P.3d at 138. Additionally, Claimant sought
medical care from Dr. Scott Meissner, a chiropractor, for low back pain and
maintenance in December 2005, and missed three days of work. Tr. 18:6-12;
19:3-5; 19:19-20. Prior to his employment with Joslin, Claimant complained to
his supervisor he wanted to get out of the drywall business because it was
causing him back pain. CI, Ex. 2:2001. Dr. Weiss testified Claimant had a
history of two motor vehicle accidents, one sufficient to cause hearing loss and
another causing him to seek emergency room care and be taken off work.''
Weiss fr. 44:6-10.

One of these accidents also caused Claimant back pain.

Weiss fr. 11:23-24. Therefore, because there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the Commission's determination that Claimant had a
preexisting back condition, that finding should not be disturbed on appeal.29
Sunquisf, 141 ldaho at 453, 111 P.3d at 138
Finally, Claimant discusses the iack of prior diagnostic studies showing

Ciaimant asserts the Court requires preexisting conditions be proven by medical evidence
deveioped either prior to the empioyment at issue or when an occupationai disease became
symptomatic. CI. Brief p. 46-47. As just explained, this is precisely what happened here: the
Commission determined Ciaimant had back problems preexisting his empioyment with Josiin.
in further support of his Nelson argument, Ciaimant discusses the credibiiity (or iack thereof) of
his supervisor. GI. Brief p. 38-40. However, as stated above, "conclusions reached by the
industrial Commission regarding the credibiiity and weight of evidence wili not be disturbed unless
the conclusions are clearly erroneous." Sunquisf, 141 idaho at 453, 111 P.3d at 138, citing
Hughen, 137 ldaho at 351, 48 P.3d at 1240. In other words, it is for the Commission, not this
Court, to weigh the credibility of lay and expert witnesses. As such, the Commission should
disregard Claimant's arguments on this issue.
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degenerative disc disease as well as the medical implications of Claimant's
December 2005 x-ray and January 2008 MRI to support h ~ sNelson claim
regarding preexisting conditions. CI. Brief p. 41-47. What Claimant neglects to
point out, however, is that he is not a medical expert and is in no way qualified to
give these opinions.

See, e.g., Jones, 134 ldaho at 163, 997 P.2d at 624

("Workmen's compensation cases, because of their medical aspects, depend
upon knowledge neither expected nor possessed by lay witnesses, and the bass
for any award must rest upon and be supported by medical testimony").
Claimant essentially asserts various medical opinions without either any
qualifications to do so or any reference in the record to an actual medical
expert's testimony (i.e., to Dr. Frizzell, Dr. Bates, Dr. Weiss or otherwise). For
these reasons, the Court should wholly reject this entire line of reasoning.
Likewise, the Commission found Claimant's MRI more persuasive than his
previous x-ray, and that finding of fact should not be disturbed on appeal. See

R. p. 173-74 ("The 2008 MRI results coupled with Dr. Weiss's opinion support
the Commission's finding that Claimant suffered from preexisting degenerative
disease that was not caused by work for his employer") and Sunquist, 141 ldaho
at 453, 11I P.3d at 138.
In short, although the Court's decisions in Ogden and, to a far lesser
degree, Nelson and its progeny, provide context for the Commission's decision, it
is the Commission's relative weighing of the opinions of Dr. Weiss and Dr.
Frizzell upon which the case turned. Therefore, regardless of its reference to
Nelson, the Commission's decision in the instant case still should stand because
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it was properly decided and Claimant has not proven he has an occupational
disease causally related to his employment with Joslin.
E.

CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
Claimant asserts entitlement to attorneys fess because Respondents

"contested a claim for compensation without reasonable ground." Cl. Brief p. 48
(internal quotations omitted).

Whether or not to award attorneys fees in a

workers compensation matter pursuant to I.C.

72-804 is a factual

determination within the control of the Industrial Commission. Hoye v. Daw
Forest Products, 125 ldaho 582, 587, 873 P.2d 836, 841 (1994) (upholding the
Commission's decision not to award attorneys fees because the surety did not
act unreasonably in failing to pay medical expenses related to claimant's
occupational disease). Such fees are not granted as a matter of right, and may
be recovered only if the requirements of § 72-804 are met. Poss v. Meeker
Machine Shop, 109 Idaho 920, 926, 712 P.2d 621, 627 (1985) (holding claimant
not entitled to fees because there was "uncertainty and doubt" as to the surety's
responsibility to pay medical benefits).
Claimant has not met the standard explained above pursuant to which
attorneys fees may be awarded. To begin, the paramount "reasonable ground"
ts
benefits was the opinions of Dr. Weiss. The fact
on which ~ e s ~ o n d e ndenied
that the Commission agreed with Respondents - twice - illustrates their actions
were not "without reasonable ground." Cl. Brief p. 48. Further, Page,v. McCain
Foods, Inc. is easiiy distinguished here and is not "closely analogous" to this
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case.3o IC 2002-007246, 2009 WL 5850555 (Sept. 8, 2009); CI. Brief p. 48.
The Commission awarded attorneys fees in Page where the claimant had
surgery in May 2008 and defendants did not obtain an IME until 10 months later
in March 2009. Page, IC 2002-007246

7 35.

Here, however, Claimant filed his

Complaint on June 11, 2008 and Respondents sent a letter to Dr. Weiss
requesting an IME on September 2, 2008
1-2, Cl. Ex. 14.

- less than three months later.

R. p.

Respondents' prompt action in this case, especially when

compared to Page, militates against the award of attorney fees. Therefore, the
Court should not award fees to Claimant in this case.

CONCLUSION
ClaimantlAppeliant has not carried his burden of proof below or on
appeal.

He provides no new evidence the Commission did not have, and

carefully weighed, in reaching its original decision. The Commission found that
he did contract or incur an occupational disease causally related to his
employment with Joslin. There is no precedent in either this Court or below that
would require reversal of the Commission's decision in this case. Respondents'
actions were at all times reasonablei meaning Claimant is not entitled to
attorneys fees. Thereupon, Respondents respectfully request this Court reject
Claimant's appeal and affirm the decision of the Industrial Commission filed on
June 8,2009.

30 Available

at hit~:llwww.iic.idaho.aovldecisions/2009109
O91paqe v mccain foods.pdf.
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,"
Respectfully su brnitted

o$F[iihL.&~i

0.

7
LAW OFFICES OF HARMON,
WHITTIER & DAY

Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
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